This paper presents a growth model that can explain the coexistence of intellectual property rights and R&D subsidies as a response to the presence of both market and government failures. The framework can also generate the observed positive correlation between these two policy tools.
Introduction
The promotion of R&D is one of the most important items in the government's policy agenda. I could not be otherwise since technological change is perceived as the main source of sustained economic growth. Two main tools of R&D policy to foster innovation are subsidies and patent protection. Both are widely used across nations, and follow clear patterns along the development process. However, standard R&D-based growth frameworks do not o¤er an explanation for why both tools are simultaneously used. In these models, market failures justify innovation policy, and R&D subsidies per se are able to achieve the …rst best. 1 Some of the literature on optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) suggests reasons why innovation subsidies might not be optimal, but never analyzes both tools jointly. 2 The lack of an explanation within a formal framework for the coexistence of di¤erent policy tools is an important gap in a literature that tries to shed light on the optimal design of R&D policy and its macroeconomic implications. This paper advances in that direction, and studies how this coexistence depends on …nancial and public sector considerations.
More speci…cally, we propose an R&D-based growth framework that simultaneously explains patents and government-…nanced R&D as a response to the existence of both market and government failures. In the model, market failures include intertemporal knowledge spillovers, diminishing returns to R&D e¤ort, and monopoly pricing. The public sector, on the other hand, fails because the e¢ ciency of one unit of income collected in taxes is less than one when invested in R&D. This can be due for example to public …nance costs, bureaucracy corruption, and public sector inability to target R&D projects e¢ ciently. The model also considers the existence of transaction costs in the private …nancial sector.
Under these circumstances, R&D subsidies must be paired with patent protection. This is the …rst-best outcome, unless one the following scenarios occurs: (i) the public sector is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient, in which case subsidies are not implemented; (ii) the private …nancial activity incurs in relatively large costs, making patent protection socially undesirable.
The model can explain the observed simultaneous increase in both government R&D spending and the strength of IPR. It occurs in our framework as the public 1 Examples include the seminal contributions of Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) , and Aghion and Howitt (1992) . For a review of the market failures considered in the R&D literature and policy analysis, see for example Acemoglu (2008) . 2 The study of optimal IPR goes back at least to Nordhaus (1968 Agnion and Howitt (1998) suggest that, in the absence of IPR, information problems might be behind the inability of R&D subsidies to achieve the …rst best.
sector becomes more e¢ cient, because of the complementarity of private and public innovation e¤ort. The impact on private and public R&D are, however, di¤erent depending on who becomes more e¢ cient. While more e¢ cient public …nance increases the share of both private and public R&D in national income, a higher degree of e¢ ciency in the …nancial market rises the share of private innovation e¤ort but diminishes the public one.
Model
Consider a closed economy similar to the one in Romer (1990) populated by utilitymaximizing in…nitely-lived consumers. There are three types of activities: consumptiongoods production, intermediate-goods manufacturing, and R&D investment. The second sector operates under monopolistic competition, and the other two obey perfect competition. R&D is intended to create new designs for new types of producer durables. In this economy, intellectual piracy can prevent the inventor from appropriating any bene…t from his discoveries: when a new design is created, there is a probability that an intermediate-goods producer acquires the perpetual patent over the design that allows monopoly pricing. The government chooses the levels of patent protection and subsidies to the R&D activity.
Households
A continuum of identical consumers of size L that grows at rate n inhabit the economy. 3 Consumers are endowed with one unit of labor in each period that is supplied inelastically. Their preferences are given by the following log-utility function:
where c(j) is the amount of consumption per capita in period j, and is the subjective discount rate.
There is a capital market that supplies consumers'saving to intermediate-goods
producers that issue securities. The equilibrium interest rate r clears the market at each point in time. The representative consumer's feasibility constraint is then given
where w is the salary, a represent the value of the securities owned by each consumer, and h 0 are taxes. Consumers choose the time series of consumption that maximizes (1) subject to (2) . The …rst order condition to this problem gives the Euler equation for consumption per capita:
Final goods
An homogeneous …nal output Y is produced employing a variety of intermediate capital goods
Final-goods manufacturers are price takers, and earn zero pro…ts in equilibrium. Because intermediate goods are rented rather than sold, equation (4) implies that they solve the following problem:
where p(i) is the rental price of producer durable type i. For the interior solution to this problem, the …rst order conditions are pricing on sales of the purchased variety. Firms, however, can also obtain access to the new knowledge with probability 1 through costless intellectual piracy. We assume that this only occurs before the patent is sold, and that when an idea is stolen from the inventor it becomes public knowledge that any …rm can use. The value of depends on the degree of intellectual property protection chosen by the public sector.
Producer durables
The manufacturing process in this activity requires investing raw capital coming from saved manufacturing output as follows: a unit of capital can be converted at no cost into one unit of any variety of intermediate goods. There is no depreciation in the model.
The problem of intermediate-goods …rms that buy a patent and become monopolists is
where p(i) is given by equation (7), and the parameter f represents a transaction cost that depends on the e¢ ciency of …nancial markets. In particular, for each unit that agents want to invest, they incur in a cost of f 1, that is, they need to borrow f 1 units. The optimal solutions are standard in the literature. In particular, the price charged by the monopolist is
And the amount of pro…ts in the symmetric equilibrium, where x(i) = x M , equals:
where from (7) and (9)
Firms that obtain the new idea through piracy will also solve (8) but taking p(i)
as given because they operate under perfect competition. The solution is now
As a consequence, all …rms that fall into this class will produce the same amount
and pro…ts in equilibrium will equal zero.
Comparing expression (11) and (13), we see that
The amount of capital employed by monopolists is a fraction of the one rented by perfect-competition …rms, and this fraction rises with the elasticity of capital in …nal-goods production.
R&D sector
A large number of …rms invest in R&D to create new varieties of intermediate goods according to technology:
where R is the amount of output investing in R&D, and R is its average across …rms.
Even though the individual …rm perceives constant returns, R&D investment at the aggregate displays diminishing returns (0 < < 1). In addition, there are intertemporal knowledge spillovers (0 < < 1). There exist institutions that guarantee with probability that inventors can obtain patents on the new ideas that they generate.
There is free entry in the industry.
Patents not copied can be sold at a price P A . In equilibrium, investment in R&D is pinned down by the zero pro…t condition
where M A = _ AP A , that is, the maximum level of revenues attainable in the market for patents, and A 1 captures the e¤ect of government subsidies on costs.
The fraction of government-…nanced R&D in total R&D investment equals ( A 1)= A . Hence, it is proportional to the one of the private sector. The way subsidies are introduced implies that public and private investment in innovation behave as complementary. The policy-maker chooses the value of A necessary to complement each unit of private R&D so as to achieve the social optimum. 4 Finally, the evolution of the patent price must obey the following no-arbitrage condition:
It says that investors in equilibrium are indi¤erent between investing in the capital market and investing in the patent market.
Public sector
The government decide A and . We assume that patent protection enforcement is costless. 5 As a consequence, the public sector collects lump-sum taxes to …nance only R&D subsidies. In particular,
where d 2 (0; 1] is the e¢ ciency level of each unit collected in taxes. 4 We could formalize this idea, for example, assuming that public subsidies mainly …nance basic R&D, whereas the private sector focuses on applied R&D. See David et al. (2000) , among others, for evidence on the complementarity between public and private R&D. 5 Alternatively, we could assume that maintaining the intellectual property right system requires spending equal to R; where > 0. This would not change the main results of the paper.
The distortions captured by d limit the capacity of the public sector to use taxes e¢ ciently, and their size depends on the quality of institutions. We can think, for example, that some taxes are lost in the collection process due to corruption, or that one R&D unit …nanced by government is less e¤ective than if …nanced by the private sector. The latter is consistent with Agnion and Howitt's (1998) suggestion that the public sector can have problems at targeting the right innovation projects due to asymmetric and incomplete information.
Capital market clearing and optimal R&D share
The economy's capital stock K must equal the sum of all units of intermediate goods produced,
Employing (14), we can write
As expected, K falls with the degree of intellectual-right protection because the industry moves away from perfect competition.
Expressions (7), (12) and (18) imply that
Higher transaction costs in …nancial markets or a stronger degree of imperfect competition lead to lower interest rates. In the same way, combining (4) and (14), aggregate output takes the form:
A larger limits the amount of producer durables available for …nal-goods manufacturing, and the amount of consumption goods.
It is also simple to obtain the optimal steady-state share of R&D in national income (s R ). From equations (13), (16) and (20)
where g A denotes the growth rate of variable A. The R&D share rises with intellectual property protection and R&D subsidies, but is not a¤ected by the level of …nancial market development. Notice also that the expression says that R&D …nanced by the private sector s R = A only depends on (positively) and the …nancial cost f (negatively).
Optimal R&D Policy
The social optimal allocation is obtained solving the central planner's problem. The policy-maker takes into consideration all the failures that the economy su¤ers. The way some of these failures are introduced into the maximization problem is through the aggregate form of the production functions, and that is why we derive them …rst.
Aggregate production
Substituting (18) into (20), we …nd that
This aggregate production function for consumption goods implies that new ideas are a source of labor-augmenting technical change.
The quotient in expression (22) deserves further explanation. It is the result of di¤erent producer durables being manufactured in industries with di¤erent competitive structures. Because of diminishing returns to capital, it displays a U-shape with respect to that achieves a maximum value of 1 when all intermediate goods are produced under the same competitive structure (i.e., when either = 0 or = 1), and a minimum at 2 (0:5; 1). According to the …nal-goods production, a …xed K should be then distributed equally among industries. However, besides this static matter, the central planner must take into account that a larger degree of imperfect competition has dynamics e¤ects on A and K.
Let us next focus on the R&D equation. All …rms in the innovation sector invest the same amounts of inputs. This equilibrium fact and expression (15) obtain the aggregate production of ideas as
A well known implication of equation (23) is that the steady-state growth rate of designs is given by exogenous parameters. In particular, in order for _ A=A to be a constant along the balanced growth path, the growth rate of A 1 must exactly match the one of R . Notice next that function (22) and the feasibility constraint of the economy imply that, at steady state, output and all types of investments grow in per capita terms at the rate of the technological parameter -that is, at g A . With this information, it is immediate to show that the steady-state value of g A is given by n=(1 ).
The command-optimum
R&D policy variables are chosen so as to maximize the expected ‡ow of utility of a representative agent given the constraints of the economy. Substituting (16), (17) and (22) into the economy's feasibility constrain and the aggregate R&D technology, we can write the government's problem as:
subject to
where C is aggregate consumption. For simplicity, we assume that the government takes M A -the potential market for patents -as given. Equation (26) introduces the transaction cost f paid on borrowing for investing in capital accumulation and patent purchase. Expression (27) gives government spending G, and is obtained combining (16) and (17). The …st order conditions for the interior solution to this dynamic programming problem are the following:
where
The …rst two conditions are the Euler equations for consumption and R&D spending, respectively. Expression (29) says that C grows at the optimum at the rate implied by the interest rate, which gives the bene…t of saving and renouncing to current consumption, net of the subjective discounted rate that gives the cost. If the central planner eliminates the monopoly pricing distortion then r = Y =( f K). Otherwise, the interest rate is given by (19). In the same vein, Euler equation (30) requires that in the optimum agents must be indi¤erent between investing an additional unit in the capital market, which provides a return r, or allocating it to R&D, whose social return is given by the RHS of condition (30).
Expression (31) provides the trade-o¤ between the two policy instruments and
A . Their contribution to the accumulation of ideas is the same. They di¤er, however, in terms of the costs imposed to the economy. The LHS of (31) implies that if the government is ine¢ cient ( d < 1), R&D subsidies can be costly compared to private R&D. Furthermore, if 1= d is su¢ ciently larger than f , the optimal A becomes zero and there are no subsidies to innovation. The opposite can also be true if …nancial markets are associate with relatively large transaction costs. In particular, when f is su¢ ciently bigger than 1= d , the social optimum is associated with absence of patent protection. Focusing now on the RHS, it says that patent protection distorts the industry's competitive structure. The aggregate e¤ect of this distortion can be positive or negative. It is negative when the strictly decreasing function f ( ) takes on positive numbers, which occurs for values of su¢ ciently small ( < ). In the interior solution where both patent protection and subsidies are employed, the two costs must be equalized.
Let us concentrate on balanced-growth path outcomes, and more speci…cally, on the ones related to the case in which both instruments are used simultaneously, be-
cause this is what we observe in reality. To guarantee the interior solution, we assume that d f 2 ( ; 1) for some su¢ ciently large, and that < . Combining (21) and (31) deliver the following expression that de…nes as a function of only d , f , g A , and :
In expression (33), the LHS is strictly increasing in and always greater or equal than 1. As a consequence, intellectual property protection becomes stronger if f d rise or g A decreases when both policy instruments coexist. We obtain that a more e¢ cient government (higher d ) has stronger IPR because the impact of on R depends positively on A .
Equation (33) also implies that when the transaction costs increase, the government tends to stronger patent protection to incentive R&D investment. A larger transaction cost in …nancial markets can be as well interpreted for R&D …rms as a larger risk premium. Then, the model predictions are consistent with the increase in patent protection that followed the change in …nancial regulations introduced in the U.S. to encourage venture capital into hi-tech …rms (e.g., See Coriat and Orsi 2002).
We now turn to the optimal R&D subsidy A . Combining (30), (31) and (33), we obtain
Because rises with d f , A can go down or up. If the e¤ect of d f on the RHS dominates, an increase in these parameters will bring an increase in A . In that case, a more e¢ cient government or a more ine¢ cient …nancial sector will call for a higher innovation subsidization rate.
Finally, using expressions (21) and (34), the steady-state share of government…nanced R&D equals
Again, because both terms inside brackets go up with d f , the net e¤ect on government…nanced R&D is unclear. 
Conclusion
R&D policy is one of the most important items in the public policy agenda. The lack of an e¢ cient public R&D strategy is many times blamed for low economic growth, low wages, large unemployment rates, and even trade de…cits. Two are the main types of actions that the public sector employes to promote R&D: patent protection and R&D subsidies. This paper has tried to improve our understanding of the design and evolution of these two R&D policy instruments. Our main contribution has been building a theory that can formally explain the coexistence of IPR and R&D subsidies. In sharp contrast to more standard R&D-based growth models, R&D subsidies in our model can not achieve the …rst best due to the existence of government ine¢ ciencies. The model is able to explain as well the increase in government R&D and the strength of IPR along the development path as a consequence of an improvement in government e¢ ciency in spending relative to the private sector.
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